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In the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah
GAYLAND, a Utah Corporation,
Respondent,

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH; LAMONT B. GUNDERSEN, EDWIN Q. CANNON, SR.,
and WILLIAM G. LARSON, Individually and as members of
the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County.

CASE

No. 9280

Appellants.

Appellant's Reply Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant refers to the Statement of Facts as
Contained in Appellant's original brief.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE RECORD CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE CONCERNING WHETHER SALT LAKE
COUNTY. HAS OR HAS NOT ADOPTED A MASTER
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2
PLAN FOR LAND UTILIZATION, AND THIS COURT
SHOULD NOT NOW INVALIDATE SALT LAKE
COUNTY'S ORDINANCES ON THE BASIS OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS FINDING IN THAT
REGARD.
POINT II: THE VALIDITY OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCES IS NOT CONDITIONED UPON NOR AFFECTED BY THE ADOPTION OF A MASTER PLAN FOR LAND UTIUZATION OR FAlLURE THEREOF.
POINT III: IF A MASTER PLAN IS A PREREQUISITE TO ZONING AND THE REQUIREMENTS
OF A MASTER PLAN ARE NOT MET, AS CONTENDED BY RESPONDENT, RESPONDENT STILL
HAS NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY THE OMISSION
THEREOF.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RECORD. CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE
WHETHER SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS OR HAS NOT
ADOPTED A MASTER PLAN FOR LAND UTILIZATION, AND THIS COURT SHOULD NOT NOW INVLIDATE SALT LAKE COUNTY'S ORDINANCES ON
THE BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS
FINDING IN THAT REGARD.
· ··At page 20 of its brief, respondent argues that:
"It is conceded in the pleadings and was
admitted by counsel in the court below that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Salt Lake County has not complied with the
law in regard to establishing a master plan
and holding hearings thereon."
First it should be noted that respondent does
not cite us to a record of any admission of appellant's counsel that Salt Lake County has failed to
adopt a master plan. It is submitted that a reading of
the record herein discloses no such admission.
As to whether or not appellant conceded that
point in its pleadings, we refer to paragraph 9 of
respondent's complaint wherein it is alleged:
"Title 8 of Salt Lake County ordinances
covering zoning and planning and the entirety thereof and in particular Chapter 8-18-1
thereof are unlawful and illegal for the following reasons.''
And subparagraph "C" of paragraph 9 which
elaborates on that allegation as follows:
"The Salt Lake County Planning Commission has not adopted any master plan covering or affecting the matter of land use
within this County.''
Appellant's response to said allegation is contained
in paragraph 7 of its answer as follows:
"In answer to paragraph 9, defendants
deny that Title 8 of the Salt Lake County ordinances or any part thereof is unlawful or
illegal for the reasons alleged or for any other
reason whatsoever."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is submitted that appellant's answer was obviously intended to and did constitute a general
denial of the allegations of paragraph 9 of respondent's complaint, and cannot fairly be interpreted
as a concession that Salt Lake County has not
adopted a master plan. Appellant is unable to locate another provision in the pleadings that might
be interpreted as a concession on that point.
There being no evidence on the question of
whether or not Salt Lake County has adopted a
master plan, the court below erred in its finding
that it had not, and this court should not now find
that Salt Lake County zoning ordinances are invalid
based upon that erroneous finding.

POINT II
THE VALIDITY OF SALT LAKE COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCES IS NOT CONDITIONED UPON
NOR AFFECTED BY THE ADOPTION OF A MASTER PLAN FOR LAND UTILIZATION OR FAILURE
THEREOF.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 17-27-l provides as
follows:
"The boards of countv commissioners of
the respective counties Within the state are
authorized and empowered to provide for
the physical development of the unincorporated territory within the county and for the
zoning of all or any part of such unincorporated territory in the manner hereinafter provided." (Emphasis added)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It should be noted that the county commissioners are empowered to provide for two things, the
physical development and zoning. This matter somehow escaped the respondent, for in his complaint,
at paragraph 9-a, it refers to that same provision
but omits the objectionable part as follows:
"Section 17-27-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, grants to the board o£ county commissioners of the counties in the State of Utah
the power to zone all or any part of the unincorporated territory within the county in the
manner provided in succeeding sections."
The succeeding sections of Chapter 27 provide
various ways in which the physical development
of the county may be accomplished, one of which
is the adoption of a master plan.
17-27-4, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in
part as follows:
" . . . the master plan of a county with
the accompanying maps, plats, charts and
descriptive and explanatory matter shall show
the county planning commission's recommendations for the development of the territory covered by the plan, and may include,
among other things, the general location,
character and extent of streets or roads, viaducts, bridges, parkways, playgrounds, forests, reservations, parks, airports, and other
public ways, grounds, places and spaces; the
general location and extent of public utilities and terminals whether publicly or privately owned, for water, light, power, sanitaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion, transportation, communication, heat and
other purposes; the acceptance, widening, removal, extension, relocation, narrowing, vacation, abandonment, or change of use of any
of the foregoing public ways, grounds, places,
space.s, properties, utilities, or terminals; ..."
(emphasis added)
From this it seems clear that the purpose of
the master plan is to provide a plan or guide for
the construction and installation of public improvements. No mention is made in his section of any
provisions for zoning.
17-27-6, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, provides in
part that:
''The master plan shall be available for
public inspection in the office of the planning
commission at all reasonable times, but its
purpose and effect shall be solely to aid the
planning commission in the performance of
its duties."
Chapter 27 then provides still another aid to
the county commissioners in providing for the physical development of the county; i.e., an official map.
Title 17, chapter 27, U.C.A., 1953, then provides
in a series of sections, 17-27-9 to 17-27-19, independent of any foregoing sections except 17-27-1, that
counties may make a zoning plan; that said plan
should be certified to the county commission; that
there should be a public hearing thereon; and after
the foregoing, for the regulation of land use by zonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing. No mention is made of a requirement that there
should first be adopted a "master plan."
17-27-20, U.C.A., 1953, makes it clear that two
distinct kinds of plans are comprehended when it
provides:
"Before finally adopting and certifying
any plan, either master or zoninq, the planning commission, regional county or district,
making such plan, shall submit such plan to
the state planning commission for advice and
recommendations." (emphasis added)
Nowhere is there any indication that one plan
was intended to be dependent upon the other, but
respondent would have us believe that the "Zoning
Plan" is merely part of the "Master Plan," when respondent describes it as the " ... zoning portion of
the master plan." (R-18)
The remaining sections oi Title 17, Chapter 27,
U.C.A., 1953, provide still another means whereby
the county commissione:rs can provide for the physical development of the county; i.e., the regulation
of subdivisions.
In its brief at the top of Page 20, respondent
emphasizes the words "from and after the time",
followed by the unemphasized words "the county
planning commission of any county, in accordance
with the procedure hereinabove specified, makes,
adopts, and certifies to the board of county commissioners a plan or plans for zoning the unincorporated territory within the county, or any part
thereof, including both the full text of a zoning
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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resolution and the maps, and after public hearing
thereon, then the board of county commissioners,
may by resolution regulate in any portion or portions of such county . . . etc," seemingly implying
that the requirement has not been met. While, as in
the case of the master plan, there is no evidence on
that point, appellant now asserts that all of those
requirements and indeed all prerequisites to zoning
regulation by the county have been met.
Respondent at page 21 of its brief points out
that:
"Whenever such a requirement for a
master plan exists and where it has not been
met the courts have with uniformity held that
the zoning powers may not be exercised."
(emphasis added)
It then cites several cases to that effect. Appellant agrees with this statement but points out that
a master plan is not a requirement in Utah, that a
zoining plan apparently is a requirement, and that
such a plan has been adopted. The reference to the
requirement of a plan in the cases cited by respon·
dent, if they have a counterpart in Utah law, are
similar to our requirement to a zoning plan and not,
it is submitted, to a master plan which appellant
points out is merely authorized as a guide to the
planning commission and is not made a prerequisite to any action of either the planning or county
commissions.
At this point, appellant will incorporate in its
brief Appendix A, a reproduction of a recent dis-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cussion of the present problem which it believes will
be of interest to the court.
The article being reproduced in whole, appellant will not now editorialize upon it except to say
that by its submission appellant does not ask the
court to legislate away whatever requirements our
existing statutes impose upon us. Appellant takes
the position that all that is required has been done.
In addition appellant points out that the statutes under attack by respondent are to be applied to all
counties o~ the state. If the court finds that the prerequisites to zoning are so severe that Salt Lake
Couny has been unable to comply, the smaller
counties of the state face an impossible burden.

POINT III
IF A MASTER PLAN IS A PREREQUISITE TO
ZONING AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF MASTER
PLAN ARE NOT MET, AS CONTENDED BY RESPONDENT, RESPONDENT STILL HAS NOT BEEN
PREJUDICED BY THE OMISSION THEREOF.
Respondent in its brief attacked the conclusion
of the trial court that:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
''(A) The Board of Salt Lake County Commissioners have failed to follow the provisions of the Statutes of the State of Utah in
regard to the adoption of a master plan for
land utilization. Such failure, however, does
not invalidate in total their zoning powers and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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would be grounds for setting aside a zoning
action only in cases where it appeared froni
the evidence that the failure to adopt such
master plan was to the prejudice o£ the instant case. The evidence submitted in this
case does not establish that such failure pta.
judiced the substantial rights of the plaintiff
herein.''
Appellant points out that the provisions authorizing a master plan which respondent interprets as
a necessary prerequisite to zoning provides at
17-27-6, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, in part as follows:
"The master plan shall be available for
public inspection in the office of the planning
commission at all reasonable times, but its
purpose and effect shall be solely to aid the
planning commission in the performance of
its duties."
Inasmuch as the recommendation of the planning board to the county commissioners was in respondent's favor, respondent can hardly claim that
it was prejudiced by the failure of the planning commission to have before it a master plan.
Further respondent urges at the bottom of page
22 and the top of page 23 of its brief that it was deprived of a hearing and an opporunity to protest.
Appellant points out that respondent did not avail
itself of this opportunity at the time of the adai}
tion of the "Zoning Plan", a more appropriate time
to make such a protest, but, of course, this is another matter not in evidence.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellant requests
that this court now declare that a master plan is
not a prerequisite to Salt Lake County's power to
zone; that it af£irm the trial court's conclusion that
respondent has not been prejudiced by the omission of a master plan if such omission exists; and
in the alternative, if it determines that a master plan
is a prerequisite to zoning by Salt Lake County, that
it remand the matter to the trial court for a determination concerning whether a master plan exists.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES
Salt Lake County Attorney
LOUIS M. HAYNIE, and
GERALD E. NIELSON
Deputies Civil Division
Attorneys for Appellant
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APPENDIX A
November. 1960
ZONING DIGEST
THE "MASTER PLAN"-A STATUTORY

PREREQUISITE TO A ZONING ORDINANCE?
David N. McBride and Richard F. Babcock
II you don't own a horse, wby lrtn
about putting tbe cart before it1

It is an exhilirating exercise to criticize
zoning. The authors yield to no one in oneupmanship at this; the most popular spectator
. . sport among planners and zoning lawyers.
We have, however, decided to file a protest
. against the ground rule, the general acceptance of which is fast becoming catechism:
that zoning ordinances must by legislative
ukase be based upon "a master plan." The
evidence is clear that more state legislators
are beguiled each year with this "basic principle," or, at least, they fear to question this
sanctified credo.
Before we are branded as counterrevolutionaries, plotting to defile Bassett, Haar, and
the U.S. Department of Commerce, we make
it clear: Zoning should be subordinate to
planning, and should, therefore, both follow
and serve that municipal concern. Zoning is
quote a useful technique provided it is recognized as only one o£ a number of legal tools
to implement a program for sound and proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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gressive community growth unquote. The rub
is that someone has persuaded legislators that
if the phrase "master plan" (ah, there, "comprehensive") is inserted in the enabling act
as a prerequisite to zoning, the rest of the job
is a snap. Even the most benighted local citizenry cannot fail then to incorporate the Good,
the True, and the Beautiful into its zoning ordinance. This, of course, is fiddle-faddle. Personally, we would rather sweat and groan
with a group of citizens who, having never
heard of planning, want a regulatory ordinance to control simple matters like billboards,
septic tanks on small lots, and strip business
development than waltz with that sophisticated band which is confident that once it adopts
a plan which it characterizes as "master" it
must follow that the subsequent zoning ordinance can only be perfect.
If there are meaningful planning principles, zoning must be based upon them. The
first and most painful step, however, is to
enunciate those principles; not to assume
them and then to make that unchallenged
premise a legislative prerequisite to the adoption of a regulatory ordinance. The goal more
appealing to us should be to give one leg
up to that community which dares to explain
in its zoning ordinance what it means by planning, but not to grant each Thomasville, Dixon, and Harrisburg the aura of respectability
by permitting it to veneer its regulatory ordinance by codifying a brace of Zip-a-toned
maps, provided they are labeled "master
plan.''
We propose that all state zoning enabling
acts abolish (repeat: abolish) the requirement
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that a zoning ordinance be based upon a
master plan. Instead, we want to substitute
· the following: (1) The preamble to each zoning ordinance must state whether or not the
community has a plan (call it what you like)
upon which the ordinance is based. (2) If the
preamble states that _such a plan does exist,
it must then also state what is encompassed
by the plan, its precise objectives and its principles, the relevant documents which substantiate the plan, and where copies of these
documents may be examined by interested
parties. Before we note the unmistakable advantages of such a revisionary proposal, it
might be well to examine the prospect before
us.
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
of the U.S. Department of Commerce is the
progenitor of the mandatory dogma,1 although
it refers to "comprehensive plan," not "master
plan," about which nicety more later. From
that source the more enlightened jurisdictions
drew their statutes. The Connecticut statute
is illustrative of one branch of the family. It
requires that zoning regulations "shall be
made in accordance with a comprehensive
plan." The statute does not define the phrase.
(Apparently to do so would be to insist upon
· footnoting the Ten Commandments.) This
omission is convenient; another section of
the same general title of the Connecticut statufe provides that the plan commission "shall
prepare, adopt and amend a plan of development for the municipality.'' {Emphasis added.)
Elsewhere in the same title the unmodified
term "Plan" is used. Use of these varying but
similar terms has, as any fool could see, led
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the courts to engage in judicial mah-jongg.
Cf. ''Levinsky v. Zoning Comm'n of City of
Bridgeport," 127 A.2d 822 (1956) and "Couch
v. Zoning Comm'n of Town of Washington,''
I06 A.2d 173, 176 (1954). It was predictable
that a 1959 comprehensive amendment to the
Connecticut statute did not define the term.
This same lighthearted practice has been
followed in the Michigan statute, which uses
substantially equivalent terms, most of which
are not defined. The county, the township, and
the city and village enabling acts each provide that the zoning ordinance must be based
upon or be in accordance with a ''plan" designed to promote enumerated objectives of
zoning. The critical term is not defined. The
Michigan Plan Commission Act required a
"master plan," a term left undefined, and
no specific mention or reference is made to
the intended relationship (if any) between the
planning "master plan" and the "plan" which
must underlie a zoning ordinance. Likewise,
the county and the cities and towns enabling
acts of Virginia require the zoning ordinances
of these governing bodies to be related to a
"zoning plan" and to a "comprehensive plan,''
respectively. Neither term is defined.
It may be that the confusion which developed from the term "comprehensive
plan" is, as Hugh Pomeroy suggests, due to
a misinterpretation of the purpose of the drafters who intended no more than that a zoning
ordinance be (a) comprehensive and (b) "reasonable" in the constitutional sense.2 If this
were where the matter stood, there could be
no serious objection to such an · innocuous
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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condition precedent except from semanticists
and conscientious draftsmen. We suspect,
however, that Mr. Pomeroy rationalizes the intentions of the drafters with greater credit than
is appropriate. 3 More recent legislative developments indicate that the planners did intend
something more specific, and, in light of some
unsatisfactory court decisions, they decided
to make clear their intentions by changing the
adjective from the ambiguous "comprehensive" to the purportedly more precise "master," and_ defining the term in the statute. All
this is not too important. The significant development is that, as the term has been more
specifically defined, it has also retained its
place as a mandatory prerequisite to a zoning
ordinance.
One example of this latter-day approach
is the Indiana Planning and Zoning Act. It
requires a "master plan" as a condition precedent to a zoning ordinance and defines such
a plan as "a complete master plan or any of
its parts such as a master plan of land use and
zoning; of thoroughfares; of sanitation; of recreation, and other related matters, and including such ordinance and ordinances as may
be deemed necessary to implement such complete master plan or part thereof by legislative
approval and provision for such regulations
as are deemed necessary in their enforcement." The Indiana Act goes on to state that
the "master plan" may consist of any of 23
items from land use maps through flood control to public education demands.
The inevitable next step was to insist that
the mandatory plan contain specific elements.
Thus the state of Washington 1959 county
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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planning enabling act provides that "zoning
maps as an official ·control may be adopted
only for areas covered by a comprehensive
plan containing not less than a land use element and a circulation element." (Note here
the use of the term "comprehensive plan" in
a context which indicates something more
than Pomeroy's comprehensive zoning ordinance.)
Indications are that this latest mandatory
and explicit technique will be extended to additional jurisdictions. The proposed Pennsylvania Zoning Act insists that every zoning
ordinance ''shall be based and interpreted
on the basis of the following planning studies:
(1) Existing Land Use Map, showing the
location and extent of existing land
uses throughout the municipality; and
(2) Proposed Land Use Plan, showing the
location and extent of planned future
land uses throughout the municipality;
and
(3) Thoroughfare Plan, showing all the
existing streets in the municipality,
the major proposed streets, indicating
them as primary and secondary and
as opened or unopened.''
A current proposal of the Zoning Committee of the Illinois State Bar Association to
amend the state planning and zoning acts provides that only after preparation of a "comprehensive plan" may a municipality undertake a zoning program. The prerequisite "comprehensive plan" is not specifically defined,
but it is required to "consist of coordinated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plans for future land use including population density and intensity of use, arterial
streets and highways, and may include,
among other things (sic), storm or flood water
run-off channels and basins, plans for public
lands and improvements, open spaces and
other amenities, parks, playgrounds and recreational areas, schools, offstreet parking,
subdivision developments, housing standards, health and safety standards, building
and construction standards, blight elimination, urban renewal and rehabilitation, conservation, streets, alleys, public service facilities, sanitation, transportation, communication
and capital improvements." (Note again the
use of the term "comprehensive plan.")
The notable exception to this exercise in
self-hypnosis is the state of California. The
California zoning enabling act expressly negates the necessity of any plan as a prerequisite to a zoning ordinance. ("This section does
not require the adoption of a master plan prior
to either the initiation or adoption of a zoning
ordinance.") The California statute provides,
nevertheless, for the adoption of plans. A
1955 amendment requires each plan commission to adopt a "master or general plan" which
consists of "a map and a statement describing it and a statement covering objectives,
principles and standards used to develop it;
and shall include all of the following elements:

(a) A land use element .. .
(b) A circulation element .. .
(c) A statement of the standards of population density and building intensity
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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recommended for the various districts
and other territorial units, and estimates of future population growth ...
(d) Supporting maps, diagrams, charts,
descriptive material and reports."
It is then provided that the "master plan"
may include several named optional elements.
The California approach makes sense. It
acknowledges the responsibility of the legislature (if it insists upon legislating "planning")
to explain what it means by that phrase. It
does not, however, insist that this historically
equivocal term must be a legislative prerequisite to a regulatory ordinance. It is our view
that California should have given a statutory
credit to those communities who dared to disclose the relationship between their zoning
ordinance and their community plan.
Our thought is to provide a legislative
bridge-not a rainbow-over the chasm between zoning and planning. The structure
would be usable by those communities who
are willing to submit the bridge to inspection.
To say that a municipality cannot adopt
a zoning ordinance unless it has a "master
plan" is an invitation to prostitute the concept
of planning by municipalities which, wishing
a zoning ordinance, are unable or unwilling
to expend the funds and energy necessary
to do an adequate job of planning. If every
community must have a plan before it can
regulate, for example, lot sizes, location of
commercial and residential uses and off-street
parking, we will see (indeed, we have seenl)
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a degeneration of planning. 4 Nor does it follow that a community cannot have a reasonably efficient and fair (and, therefore, constitutional) zoning ordinance unless it has a mas. ter plan, as a house can provide shelter and
yet offend an elementary sense of good
taste. Let us admit without the fear of undercutting a good thing, that it is possible to have
a zoning ordinance which will accomplish
many useful things without a pre-existing
community plan. To make a plan (comprehensive, master, or general) mandatory not
only encourages bastardization of planning,
but also deprives the conscientious, if impecunious, municipality of the chance to have
a zoning ordinance.
Our alternative may resolve this dilemma.
The preamble to ~ach zoning ordinance must
state whether or not it is based upon a community plan, the optional elements of which
are enumerated in the enabling act. If that
statement is in the affirmative, the preamble
must set forth precisely what is meant by that
"plan." Such requirements indicate a legislative recognition of the significant relationship
between zoning and planning. The community that adopts a zoning ordinance without
a plan must make such an admission and,
such admission being required by the legislature, it follows that this is a material fact in
any judicial determination as to the reasonableness of that ordinance. On the other hand,
if a plan is claimed, then the drafters of the
zoning ordinance must disclose on the face
of the zoning ordinance what they mean by
that term. Being required to display their
linen, they must be certain that it bears inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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spection. On this premise it is reasonable to
assume they will exercise greater concern
with genuine cleanliness than would be so if
the statutory requirement were that no laundry shall be washed without the application
of a bleach.
1 See Bair & Bartley, "The Text of a Model Zoning Ordinance,"
4 (2d ed. 1960)
2 Pomeroy, "Zoning Policies and Policy Statement," 12 Zoning
Digest, 321, 323 (1960).

3 Cf. Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 Harv.
L. Rev. 1154, 1156 (1955).

4 The lliinois Planning Act grants a municipality the power to
regulate subdivisions in the unincorporated area within
1¥2 miles of its boundaries, provided it has an "official
plan." Few lllinois planners would deny that this bait has
been used as an excuse for sloppy, makeshift, irresponsible
documents labeled "official plan."
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